Disinformation Toolkit 2.0

"Disinformation challenges the ability of international NGOs and CSOs to help improve people's lives around the globe. It generates distrust between people, herds us into filter bubbles where we're easy to convert to cynicism and fear, and drives a stake into the heart of the marketplace of ideas at the heart of the democratic process." - Adam Fivenson

From InterAction, a community of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) active globally, this toolkit examines the many ways disinformation is impacting the work of NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) across sectors of international development and provides guidance as to how these organisations can respond - and are responding - to this threat.

Built on a desk review, more than 60 interviews, and a peer review process, the toolkit begins with a conceptual review of the nature of the challenge of disinformation in the context of foreign aid and the work of CSOs and NGOs around the globe. As explained here, disinformation can be tied to the rapid, expansive growth of digital and mobile technologies. The same tools that improve people's lives and facilitate NGOs' work also deliver a constant stream of mis- and disinformation to the same populations NGOs support, counteracting their efforts to build accountable health systems, grow inclusive democracy, and mitigate harmful environmental and climate impacts. Furthermore, NGOs and CSOs themselves can be vulnerable: Powerful interests and bad actors find NGOs, whose work often upends power dynamics and economic systems that benefit some at the expense of many, to be convenient targets for public disinformation attacks as a means to escape accountability for their actions and policy choices or shield their patrons from public scrutiny.

Each of the subsequent sections includes tools, examples, and recommendations for organisations and individuals targeted by disinformation or confronting its harmful impact in the context of their civil society, development, or humanitarian work around the globe:

• Part 2 asks: What are key considerations and decision-points for NGOs that are themselves the subject of disinformation attacks? How can NGOs and CSOs keep staff, reputations, and relationships of trust with communities safe from such attacks? Having explored disinformation and the closing of civic space, this section includes examples, specific steps organisations can take to inoculate and respond to disinformation that targets them or their staff, and links to deeper technical guides created by InterAction Member organisations and other experts.
• Part 3 asks: How does mis- and disinformation impact the crisis-affected and marginalised populations NGOs and CSOs support around the globe? In light of the fact that disinformation attacks can expose the already vulnerable to discrimination and potentially violence, this section provides examples and considerations for responding in this context.
• Part 4 provides examples, resources, and tools for NGOs active in: the promotion of democracy, rights, and good governance; global health and COVID-19 response; environment and climate work; and economic growth projects. This section is intended to drive the cross-pollination of strategies and approaches to responding to disinformation as it manifests across sectors.
• Annex 1 offers links to existing tools and guides from organisations with experience in rumour tracking, media and communications, and local issues around culture, politics, and history; it includes databases of potential counter-disinformation partners.
• Annex 2 explores policy considerations - providing access, for example, to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Partnership for Countering Influence Operations (PCIO) database with the results of a systematic review of 84 public policy proposals related to disinformation released since 2016.

One of the takeaways, according to the toolkit's author, is that there are no easy answers to disinformation, which is a symptom of a larger problem. Users of mobile platforms generate data based on their online behaviours, which are then used by ad networks and platforms to sell goods and perspectives that they are likely to buy or accept based on their prior behaviours. "A world in which platform users have more control over what data they provide and how it is used is a world in which hyper-targeted disinformation is a far less potent and prevalent tool of division. As such, a proactive response to disinformation attacks must revolve around data privacy and digital rights legislation, platform transparency and algorithmic accountability, and continuing to elevate the voices and rights of the most marginalized communities around the globe..."