Turning Point: A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism

"It is not enough to merely counter these messages. We have to put our own affirmative vision forward, amplifying many different kinds of ideas and voices."

This report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) calls for a new comprehensive strategy to address the global problem of violent extremism in the United States (US) and abroad. Co-chaired by Leon Panetta and Tony Blair, this bipartisan Commission was composed of 23 public- and private-sector leaders from technology companies, civil society, the faith community, and academia. Since its public launch in February 2016, the Commission met 6 times and consulted with more than 100 experts and practitioners throughout the US, Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The goal of the Commission was to clearly articulate what the next US Administration, in close collaboration with governmental and nongovernmental partners, must do to diminish the appeal of extremist ideologies and narratives. In this report, the Commission argues for a new paradigm - one that recognises violent extremism as the global, generational challenge that it is and leverages all tools available to defeat it, including an expansion of public-private partnerships to scale up proven CVE interventions.

In brief, the Commission argues that a strategy to prevent and counter violent extremism must:

1. Strengthen resistance to extremist ideologies, forging a new global partnership around education reform and expanding efforts to enhance respect for religious diversity, stem the spread of intolerance, and reinforce community resilience to extremist narratives. Violent extremists seek to impose their vision of religion and governance on society, by force if necessary. For over a generation, private donors in the Gulf and elsewhere have contributed to the spread of extremist ideologies by funding mosques, schools, and various types of media that reject local religious, cultural, social, or political customs or understandings that contradict their own. To strengthen societal and individual resistance to extremist ideologies, the Commission suggests that the US and its allies should:
   • Stem the export of extremist ideologies. Financial support for extremist ideologues and groups must be curtailed, without jeopardising funds to legitimate, peaceful civil society organisations.
   • Inculcate respect for diversity and tolerance. The US and its allies must work together to ensure that education systems and materials do not contribute to the intolerant attitudes, "us versus them" narratives, and prejudices that fuel violent extremism.
   • Reinforce local resilience. Communities and individuals who are able to resolve conflicts peacefully, have a strong group identity or sense of self, and have opportunities to interact with each other positively are better able to resist extremist entreaties. These protective factors should be reinforced.
2. Invest in community-led prevention, enabling civil society efforts to detect and disrupt radicalisation and recruitment and rehabilitating and reintegrating those who have succumbed to extremist ideologies and narratives. Historically, efforts to counter extremist ideologies and narratives have been reactive. Rather than anticipating emerging threats, appropriate resources and expertise are often deployed after the fact. The public health field offers some important lessons for breaking this reactive cycle. A public health-based approach to CVE would entail detecting and interrupting a behaviour before it becomes dangerous and spreads, changing the thinking of those most at risk, and, in time, reshaping the social norms that exacerbate those risks. To invest in community-led prevention, the US and its allies should:
   • Build trust among key communities and potential partners. The US and its allies need to build bridges with a wide range of grassroots actors and invest in relationship-building and ongoing communication.
   • Improve detection and referral. Systematising the identification of local warning signs, raising awareness, and intervening before extremist ideologies spread are vital.
   • Raise awareness about radicalisation and recruitment. Within the US, the government should work with civil society and the private sector to expand community awareness programmes and organise safe spaces for parents, students, and teachers to learn about how terrorists radicalise and recruit youth, on and offline.
   • Increase investment in intervention, rehabilitation, and reintegration efforts in frontline communities. Long-term, flexible investments in community-level responses are essential.
3. Saturate the global marketplace of ideas, mobilising technology companies, the entertainment industry, community leaders, religious voices, and others to compete with and overtake violent extremists' narratives in virtual and real spaces. "Violent extremists have thrived by coopting local grievances and conflicts and grafting them onto a universal narrative of 'us versus them.' ISIS, for example, has succeeded at recruiting foreign fighters because it crafted tailored messages that resonated with its target audiences and provided a simple, affirmative solution for whatever ailed them - 'join us and help build an ideal society where you will always belong.'....To protect youth from being radicalized, we must not only ensure they understand how and why violent extremists are targeting them, but also disrupt recruiters' efforts to make these linkages. It is not enough to merely counter these messages. We have to put our own affirmative vision forward, amplifying many different kinds of ideas and voices." To saturate the global marketplace of ideas, the US and its allies should:
   • Reboot strategic communications efforts. The US and its allies need to fundamentally rethink the scale and delivery of "counternarratives". Strategic communications efforts will not be effective if messages are designed from foreign capitals, detached from reality, reactive, or solely focused on what we are against. Rather, narratives must be organic, embedded in local peer networks, delivered by credible messengers, and articulate a positive vision for society.
   • Engage the private sector to produce and deliver compelling narratives across media platforms. The storytelling and technical know-how of leading technology and digital media companies, when paired with local knowledge and perspectives, can professionalise and amplify efforts to promote alternative narratives. "Research has found that narrative media, such as television shows and radio soap operas, can provide a space for audience members to explore their values and process difficult or emotionally fraught material in an unthreatening way. For instance, in Egypt, an immensely popular competition reality show subtly embedded messages of hope and tolerance for Egypt's struggling youth cohort. The contestants, 14 young Egyptians from a diverse range of cultural, religious, and ethnic backgrounds, work closely with one another to become the next top entrepreneur and succeed because of, rather than in spite of, their differences."
   • Create alternative opportunities for young people to achieve meaning and status. Helping youth channel their energy and passion in a positive direction is essential for decreasing the potency of extremist ideologies and narratives.
4. Align policies and values, putting human rights at the centre of CVE and ensuring that US engagement with foreign partners advances the rule of law, dignity, and justice. When the US abandons bedrock principles, such as keeping suspected terrorists indefinitely detained at Guantanamo Bay or torturing prisoners at Abu Ghraib, that country not only undermine our own credibility, but also supplies violent extremists with fodder for their narratives. For example, the US should protect and enlarge civic space as a foreign policy priority. Civil society - and citizens' voices - must be protected in order to address the grievances and narratives that drive radicalisation and recruitment.
5. Deploy military and law enforcement tools, utilising counterterrorism tools as part of a broader political and diplomatic strategy, strengthening counterterrorism capabilities, and building rapid response teams. (Militaries and law enforcement agencies should use their unique assets and training to protect civilian populations and important religious, cultural, and historical sites at risk from violent extremist groups.)

These 5 strategic elements encompass activities that are CVE-specific and those that are CVE-relevant. CVE-specific refers to measures designed to prevent violent extremism in a direct, targeted fashion, such as intervening with someone drawn to extremist ideologies. By contrast, CVE-relevant measures are more general, intending to reduce vulnerability to extremism in an indirect way. CVE-relevant efforts are primarily advanced through education, development, human rights and governance programmes, and youth initiatives. Throughout the report, many examples of such activities as implemented in various contexts aroudn the world are provided. To cite only one: In the town of Slough, England, police officers partnered with local businesses to fund and organise programmes to empower women in the local community. Programming sought to address the needs of women from minority communities by providing access to career guidance sessions, mentorship from local business leaders, English language workshops, and related vocational training. These programmes have not only strengthened social services available to disadvantaged populations, but also have improved relations between community members and law enforcement. As a result, they collaborate more readily with local police on CVE, including communicating their concerns about individuals being radicalised or recruited. As this example demonstrates, governments interested in CVE must evidence that they are committed to helping locals address their concerns and priorities. Such an approach creates opportunities to engage on more sensitive issues like CVE once trust is established.

The report outlines a plan for implementation of the proposed strategy, recommending a new institutional structure for CVE to be headed by an assistant to the president based in the National Security Council (NSC). However: "Governments cannot and should not be the main face of CVE efforts. The private sector and civil society have tremendous contributions to make, if given sufficient resources, guidance, and backing. For the past 15 years, the U.S. government has seeded a variety of networks and initiatives—from Generation Change, a global network of young leaders building community resilience and cohesiveness, to Peer-to-Peer: Challenging Violent Extremism, an effort to enlist technology-savvy university students in developing strategic messaging campaigns. It is time to build on these efforts and ensure that U.S. investment into existing programs and people is reinvigorated. There is no need to reinvent the wheel - we must be aware of all of the tools at our disposal and use them to the best of our ability."

The below video provides access to the speeches at the 2.5-hour-long event that publicly launched Turning Point.